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 DIALOGUE
 Revisiting a Proposed Definition of
 Professional Service Firms
 In a recent Academy of Management Review
 article, Professor Andrew von Nordenflycht (2010)
 focused on defining professional service firms
 (PSFs). In the article von Nordenflycht argues that
 past research leaves the term professional service
 firms either undefined or at best provides only
 examples, such as law firms, accounting firms,
 "etc." In addition, he argues that while most schol?
 ars agree that law firms and accounting firms fit
 the "definition" of PSFs, there is "little consensus
 on what the 'etc.' refers to. Does it include ad
 agencies? Physician practices? Software firms?
 Why or why not?" (2010: 155). The author's contri?
 butions include (1) identifying three distinctive
 characteristics associated with PSFs (i.e., knowl?
 edge intensity, low capital intensity, and a profes?
 sionalized workforce), (2) arguing that while all
 PSFs share knowledge intensity, they may vary
 based on the degree of intensity of the other two
 characteristics (i.e., capital intensity and profes?
 sionalized workforce), and (3) describing manage?
 rial challenges facing each structural form and
 providing solutions. In this dialogue we discuss
 the limitations of the proposed definition, question
 the managerial challenges von Nordenflycht as?
 sociates with PSFs, and critique the correspond?
 ing solutions he offers.
 THE PROPOSED DEFINITION
 Based on a review of the PSF literature for a
 definition, von Nordenflycht "landed on three
 characteristics?knowledge intensity, low capi?
 tal intensity, and a professionalized work?
 force?as the central ones" (2010: 159). These
 three distinctive characteristics were chosen
 "because (1) they can be well defined, (2) they
 are commonly noted as distinctive characteris?
 tics ..., and (3) they have been linked in the
 literature ... to distinctive managerial chal?
 lenges or organizational outcomes" (2010: 159).
 Focusing on the three characteristics, von Nor?
 denflycht (2010) suggests developing "a taxon?
 omy of knowledge-intensive firms" that vary in
 the degree of capital intensity and workforce
 professionalization (2010: 157).
 Knowledge Intensity and
 Professionalized Workforce
 Knowledge intensity is touted as "perhaps the
 most fundamental distinctive characteristic of
 PSFs," which is said to permeate throughout the
 organization, including "frontline workers" (von
 Nordenflycht, 2010: 159). However, knowledge in?
 tensity creates two problems for PSFs: cat herd?
 ing and opaque quality (von Nordenflycht, 2010).
 We discuss each in turn.
 Cat herding. Cat herding refers to the chal?
 lenges of "retaining and directing" skilled and
 professionalized employees with "substantial
 human capital (such as complex knowledge)"
 who have "a strong bargaining position relative
 to the firm, since their skills are scarce and, in
 many instances, transferable across firms" (von
 Nordenflycht, 2010: 160). Regulation by orga?
 nized professions through their codes provides
 for "strong preferences for autonomy" (2010: 160)
 and "a responsibility to protect the interests of
 clients and/or society ... against a 'commercial'
 or 'economic' ethos that allows unfettered pur?
 suit of self-interest" (2010: 163). An implication of
 such regulation is "muted competition," both
 against potential entrants into the profession
 through licensing requirements and among pro?
 fessionals. Thus, "in the name of preserving the
 profession's trustworthiness, professional codes
 tend to prohibit a range of commercially com?
 petitive behavior, including soliciting competi?
 tors' clients, advertising in any way. .., and
 even competing on price" (2010: 164). The orga?
 nizational slack resulting from such muted com?
 petition provides
 an opportunity to address the challenges of cat
 herding in ways that would not be possible in
 more competitive environments. For example,
 firms may be better able to satisfy employee pref?
 erences for autonomy by adopting highly auton?
 omous and informal structures, whose conse?
 quent lack of internal coordination might be too
 inefficient in more competitive environments
 (2010: 164).
 Von Nordenflycht provides two organizational
 solutions to help with the problem of cat herd?
 ing: (1) alternative incentive mechanisms, "such
 as contingent and/or deferred compensation,"
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 and (2) allowing "autonomy and informality in
 organizational structure" (2010: 161).
 We argue that whether professionals (with
 substantial and complex human capital) appear
 to behave like cats or like well-mannered em?
 ployees depends on (1) how easily they can be
 replaced by the employer (i.e., how competitive
 the labor market is for their expertise) and/or (2)
 whether the task and its contexts require an
 autonomous or decentralized decision-making
 structure. On the first issue, the more competi?
 tive the market for their expertise, the more
 likely professionals will lose their job if they
 behave like cats. Given market competition and
 the transferability of human capital in many
 professional organizations, such employees are
 replaceable and, thus, easily salvageable. Al?
 though transferability of human capital may al?
 low an employee catlike behavior, since he or
 she may threaten to move to a competitor (were
 it not for a noncompete clause), transferability
 also affords the firm the ability to hire from
 competitors. Thus, cat herding problems do not
 arise because knowledge is complex; they may
 arise because of lack of competition in the mar?
 ket for a given professional. However, even in
 this case there is a limit to catlike behaviors.
 Consider, for example, one of the most canoni?
 cal examples of PSFs: law firms. In this case a
 cursory examination would reveal a high de?
 gree of competition among a group of highly
 touted professionals: lawyers. Besides the on?
 line legal service advertisements, one cannot
 avoid repeated commercials by law firms invit?
 ing injured workers or patients suffering from
 side effects of medication to patronize their ser?
 vices. In addition, a significant increase in lat?
 eral movements by associates and partners
 across firms strongly suggests competition in
 the labor market for such professionalized talent
 (Henderson & Bierman, 2009).
 We argue that an alternative explanation for
 the appearance of catlike behavior (i.e., auton?
 omy at work) is a context that requires decen?
 tralized decision making for efficiency reasons.
 Think of professors in classrooms, surgeons in
 operating rooms, or lawyers in courtrooms?all
 three groups are led by their own initiative in
 performing their tasks, with relatively little day
 to-day regard for administrative superiors. Such
 catlike behavior is organizationally efficient,
 given the idiosyncratic nature of the tasks, re?
 quiring decentralized decision rights. Unantici
 pated events may occur that provide time
 dependent information at the "local" level, to
 which professionals react autonomously. In
 these contexts the professional has the relevant
 information to behave independently and au?
 tonomously, not the supervisor. Thus, allowing
 autonomy is not a concession to professionals in
 service organizations but, rather, an efficient or?
 ganizational response to the decentralized na?
 ture of information held by professionals.
 Opaque quality. Opaque quality means that
 complex knowledge of the expert "is hard for
 nonexperts (i.e., customers) to evaluate, even af?
 ter the output is produced and delivered" (von
 Nordenflycht, 2010: 161). Von Nordenflycht ar?
 gues that opaque quality gives rise to at least
 four types of measures PSFs undertake in re?
 sponse to the challenge of opaqueness: bond?
 ing, reputation, appearance, and ethical codes.
 An example he invokes for bonding is the "un?
 limited liability partnership" structure to induce
 "partners to monitor and pressure each other to
 provide quality service since each is at risk for
 any actions of the others that expose the firm to
 financial or legal liability" (2010: 161).
 Is the opaque quality of services provided by
 PSFs an explanation for unlimited liability? Our
 observations indicate that most traditional PSFs
 are organized as limited liability partnerships
 (i.e., LLPs). For example, virtually all of the larg?
 est 200 law firms in the United States have the
 LLP postfix after their name. In addition, the U.S.
 and European subsidiaries of the major account?
 ing firms have similar structures?for example,
 KPMG Europe LLP and KPMG America LLP. All
 the KPMG operations in different areas of the
 world are set up independently as LLPs so as to
 prevent cross-liabilities and cap liability expo?
 sure (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). There are a
 few reasons for adoption of limited liability.
 First, given the large size of many PSFs, as?
 sumption of liability by each partner for the en?
 tire organization is too costly and, thus, econom?
 ically infeasible. Second, cross-monitoring of
 partners by partners is impractical when the
 PSFs are geographically diversified, with many
 national and multinational branches. Assump?
 tion of unlimited liability in these situations
 would expose each partner to high risks if he or
 she were not in a position to monitor the behav?
 ior of other partners. Finally, as the size of PSFs
 increases, the free-rider problem by each part?
 ner can prevent effective monitoring. For exam
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 pie, while the cost of monitoring other partners
 would be absorbed by a given partner, its ben?
 efits would be spread across all partners, thus
 arguably creating a free-rider problem. Given
 the impracticality of cross-monitoring in large
 and geographically diversified PSFs, unlimited
 liability has been replaced by limited liability
 in many cases.
 We believe high monitoring costs have an?
 other organizational implication: contingent
 compensation systems. Contrary to von Norden
 flycht's claim that "contingent and/or deferred
 compensation" (2010: 161) systems are a re?
 sponse to the cat herding challenge, we believe
 instead that the high monitoring costs are the
 main explanation for the adoption of such com?
 pensation systems, where each partner's com?
 pensation is contingent on his or her perfor?
 mance only. In general, when monitoring costs
 are high, organizations use contingent pay sys?
 tems as a substitute for monitoring and con?
 trol?in such systems employees become their
 own monitors since shirking at work will di?
 rectly cost them part of their compensation
 (Brickley, Smith, & Zimmerman, 2008; Milgrom &
 Roberts, 1992).
 Low Capital Intensity
 While von Nordenflycht's paper allows for
 flexibility in capital intensity, low capital inten?
 sity has a special place in his framework. In
 particular, low capital intensity is said to have
 two implications. First, PSFs requiring low cap?
 ital intensity will further increase "employee
 bargaining power" because (1) relatively speak?
 ing, if capital intensity is low, human capital
 intensity becomes even more important; (2) with
 the low cost of capital, employees may "easily
 start up their own firms"; and (3) "without non
 human capital to specialize to, there is less
 likelihood of generating firm-specific human
 capital, which would reduce employee mobility"
 (2010: 162). Thus, "if knowledge intensity creates
 the cat herding problem, adding low capital
 intensity turns it into a situation where the
 assets go down the elevator each night ... and
 the firm can't control whether they come back"
 (2010: 162). Second, low capital intensity creates
 the opportunity to lower "the need for raising
 investment funds and thereby reduces the
 need to organize in ways that protect outside
 investors" (2010: 162). The author states that, not
 having outside investors as monitors, the firm
 may resort to alternative compensation mea?
 sures and to employee autonomy and informal?
 ity as two measures of managing cat herding
 problems.
 With all due respect, we disagree with both
 implications. First, as discussed above, whether
 cat mentalities dominate PSFs hinges on the
 competitiveness of the labor market for the pro?
 fession in question. Competition and, thus,
 transferability in such markets afford the firm
 the ability to replace those "who choose not to
 ride up the elevator." Second, in spite of whether
 ownership is internal or external, alternative
 compensation measures and greater employee
 autonomy may or may not be efficient organiza?
 tional characteristics on their own. Given the
 nature of tasks in PSFs, such as law firms, hos?
 pitals, universities, and the like, jobs are de?
 signed to afford professionals decision rights
 and, hence, autonomy. We stress that such au?
 tonomy in decision rights does not signify a
 compromise or a concession to professionals
 who would otherwise behave like cats but rep?
 resents an organizational approach to efficient
 utilization of local information held by profes?
 sionals (Brickley et al., 2008; Milgrom & Roberts,
 1992).
 Ownership Structure
 Regarding ownership structure of PSFs, von
 Nordenflycht argues that there "is a resistance
 to having nonprofessionals, especially commer?
 cially oriented nonprofessionals (such as inves?
 tors), involved in the ownership and governance
 of professional firms," because PSFs have a
 "core of professional codes of ethics," whereas
 commercially oriented investors would encour?
 age "unfettered pursuit of self-interest" (2010:
 163). This argument also appears open to ques?
 tion. We believe that the alternative ownership
 structures that PSFs assume will ultimately rep?
 resent the most efficient organizational ap?
 proaches to risk sharing. A casual examination
 of the most touted and canonical PSFs (e.g., law
 firms) indicates that some PSFs have even em?
 braced the corporate form. For example, law
 firms in Australia are now permitted to sell
 shares of stock on the open market. This kind of
 ownership allows for considerable risk spread?
 ing in large class action and contingent fee
 cases (Regan, 2009).
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 TABLE 1
 Summary of Some Key Arguments
 Concept  von Nordenflycht's (2010) Argument  Our Argument
 Knowledge intensity:
 Direction
 difficulties
 ? Not being able to direct or supervise employees is
 a problem (pp. 160-161).
 ? The solution is to give the employee autonomy?
 by not trying to direct or supervise (pp. 160-161).
 Professionalized
 workforce:
 Autonomy
 Knowledge intensity:
 Retaining
 difficulties
 Opaque quality
 (customers are
 nonexperts;
 cannot evaluate
 quality of service)
 Low capital
 intensity:
 Employee mobility
 Ownership structure:
 No outside
 ownership
 "Firms may be better able to satisfy employee
 preferences for autonomy by adopting highly
 autonomous and informal structures, whose
 consequent lack of internal coordination might be
 too inefficient in more competitive environments"
 (p. 164).
 There are difficulties in retaining skilled employees
 with "substantial human capital (such as
 complex knowledge)" who have "a strong
 bargaining position relative to the firm, since
 their skills are scarce and, in many instances,
 transferable across firms" (p. 160).
 PSFs resolve opaqueness via unlimited liability
 partnership structures to induce "partners to
 monitor and pressure each other to provide
 quality service since each is at risk for any
 actions of the others that expose the firm to
 financial or legal liability" (p. 161).
 Low capital intensity increases "employee
 bargaining power.... if knowledge intensity
 creates the cat herding problem, adding low
 capital intensity turns it into a situation where
 the assets go down the elevator each night...
 and the firm can't control whether they come
 back" (p. 162).
 ? Low capital intensity gives the firm the
 opportunity to avoid outside investors as monitors
 so that the firm has the freedom to adopt efficient
 measures of alternative compensation, employee
 autonomy, and informality (p. 162).
 ? There "is a resistance to having nonprofessionals,
 especially commercially oriented
 nonprofessionals (such as investors), involved in
 the ownership and governance," because PSFs
 have a "core of professional codes of ethics,"
 whereas commercially oriented investors
 encourage "unfettered pursuit of self-interest"
 (p. 163).
 Independence in behavior is not the same thing
 as "cat herding" behavior. The former arises
 because of the nature of tasks and
 information asymmetry between
 professionals and their supervisors. Consider
 professors in classrooms, surgeons in
 operating rooms, and lawyers in courtrooms:
 all three groups are led by their own
 initiative as they perform their respective
 jobs, with no regard for administrative
 superiors. When the relevant information of
 the context is held by the professional and
 the task is idiosyncratic, efficient organization?
 al structure requires a decentralized decision
 rights system. While professionals in these
 contexts appear to behave like independent
 cats, such behaviors are efficient in these
 contexts.
 The need for (or lack of) employee autonomy
 (i.e., decentralization of decision rights)
 within an organization has less to do with its
 employees' personal preferences and more to
 do with deciding on a structure that is
 efficient given the context of the task and the
 location of the relevant information in the
 hierarchy.
 ? Transferability/mobility also affords the firm
 the ability to hire from competitors.
 ? There is a limit to job switching, because a
 professional will face difficulty in moving if
 known to have such catlike behavior.
 ? Hence, in a free market, catlike behavior of
 excessively switching jobs will be solved on
 its own over time.
 Most traditional PSFs and their subsidiaries are
 organized as limited liability partnerships
 (i.e., LLPs). In other words, personal wealth is
 not exposed to liability when such PSFs or
 subsidiaries are sued. The goal is to prevent
 cross-liabilities when faced with lawsuits;
 opaqueness is the least of their concerns
 here.
 Competition and transferability in markets
 afford the firm the ability to replace those
 who choose not to ride up the elevator in the
 morning.
 ? These arguments are questionable and
 contrary to the corporate governance
 literature. Why would an outside investor
 object to organizational measures if they are
 efficient? Outside investors support measures
 that are perceived to improve efficiency and
 performance because their wealth is at stake.
 ? In a number of countries, law firms have
 embraced the "corporate form," with stocks
 traded on the open market. Further, outside
 investors in the United States (such as hedge
 funds) invest in plaintiffs' cases as a
 substitute for direct investment in law firms.
 Finally, while law firms in the United States
 are not currently permitted to share risks with
 outside equity investors in this manner, outside
 investments have nevertheless crept into the
 U.S. legal system through the back door. Instead
 of directly investing in law firms, outside inves?
 tors in the United States (in this case, hedge
 funds) have recently started investing in plain?
 tiffs' cases?cases that would probably not oth?
 erwise be brought by plaintiffs for the risk of
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 losing. Investment in a portfolio of such cases
 lowers the cost associated with risk and works
 as a substitute for investment in law firms by
 outside investors (Glater, 2009).
 DISCUSSION AND
 CONCLUDING REMARKS
 We believe the proper question is not how to
 define a PSF but how a given service becomes
 optimally organized. The difference in these two
 approaches is significant. In this dialogue we
 have attempted to explain why PSFs, even in
 some of the most "canonical" examples (e.g.,
 law firms), fail to follow the "traditional" defini?
 tion. Growth in the size and geographic diversi?
 fication of law firms have transformed their or?
 ganizational structures and in some cases even
 allowed outside investment. Moreover, most
 large law firms in the United States, at least, are
 organizationally structured as LLPs and are in?
 creasingly active in marketing and advertising
 their services.
 In sum, we believe an attempt at defining
 organizational structure and ownership for any
 distinct group of firms, including PSFs, is ex?
 posed to creating too many exceptions that may
 fall outside the confines of the definition. In par?
 ticular, the problem of defining PSFs is that
 while a given definition may in one context
 neatly correspond to the existing organizational
 structure and ownership, changes in the context
 can render the definition irrelevant over time. As
 an alternative to defining a distinct group of
 firms, it might be more productive to examine
 how a distinct group of firms becomes optimally
 organized as contexts change. Indeed, this ap?
 pears to represent a key opportunity for future
 research in this area. We provide a summary of
 our primary critiques of von Nordenflycht's ar?
 guments in Table 1.
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 Let's Get Testing: Making Progress on
 Understanding Professional Service Firms
 First, let me offer sincere thanks to Professor
 Zardkoohi and his coauthors for their thoughtful
 critique. My goal was to generate just such dis?
 cussion, so I welcome their engagement and
 hope my detailed response is seen in that light.
 To begin, I want to offer some important con?
 text about the article's intent both to help inter?
 pret the critique and to suggest where research?
 ers might go from here. The intent of the article
 was to sort through a disconnected body of lit?
 erature to offer an integrated theoretical frame?
 work that facilitates future research on profes?
 sional service firms (PSFs) in three ways: (1) by
 defining what a PSF is, (2) by collecting and
 synthesizing the varied theories about PSFs to
 highlight how they complement or conflict with
 each other, and (3) by specifying the type of
 empirical work the field needs in order to vali?
 date and/or adjudicate among these theories.
 Specifically, the framework proposes three
 characteristics as distinctive of PSFs: Knowl?
 edge intensity, Low capital intensity, and a Pro?
 fessionalized workforce (hence, I refer to it here?
 after as the KLP framework). The KLP framework
 then draws on existing research to hypothesize
 how these three characteristics might lead to a
 range of specific organizational features.
 It is important to point out that the KLP frame?
 work incorporates competing explanations for a
